




What does happiness research mean for public
policy?
The study of individual happiness has enriched eco-
nomics with many new and sometimes challenging
(preliminary) insights.1 More and more often, it is
asked about the policy consequences that are to be
derived from these insights.We observe that econo-
mic research on happiness has an explicit or implicit
tendency to follow a “benevolent dictator”approach
where the government,and individual politicians and
public officials, are assumed to be able and willing to
pursue people’s happiness, or to maximize a social
welfare function where individuals’ welfare is pro-
xied by individuals’ reported subjective well-being.
This article proposes a different approach by using the
insights of public choice theory to develop the founda-
tions of happiness policy. In particular, politicians are
assumed to behave as other members of society do,and
to be self-interested. However, they are subject to sev-
eral constraints, in a democracy the need to secure re-
election being the most important. Following the con-
stitutional point of view (see, in particular, Buchanan
and Tullock 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1985) there
are two levels at which policy decisions are taken: in
the current politico-economic process within given
rules,and at the constitutional level,where the rules of
the game as such are determined.
The goal of our contribution is threefold. First, our
discussion should make clear that the policy ap-
proach matters for the choice of research questions
and thus for the kind of knowledge happiness
research aims to provide, as well as for the people
seen as addressees. Second, we emphasize that there
is no shortcut to an optimal happiness policy maxi-
mizing some aggregate happiness indicator as a so-
cial welfare function. Third, we argue instead that a
constitutional perspective should be applied focus-
ing on (political) institutions.
Happiness optimal policy interventions
The ordinalist revolution in economics, on which
classical micro-economics is firmly based,takes it for
granted that individual welfare can be measured
only in an ordinal,but not in a cardinal way,and that
it makes no sense to make interpersonal compar-
isons of utility.These are exactly the fundamental as-
sumptions where the countermovement of happiness
research sets in. Both cardinality and interpersonal
comparability may be less of a problem on a practi-
cal level than on a theoretical level.
If the accumulated evidence is judged sufficient, in
the sense that it allows for the cardinal measurement
and interpersonal comparison of happiness, then it
may be argued that one or more social welfare func-
tions exist which can be used to derive policies to be
pursued by democratic governments. One specific
social welfare function is the unweighted sum of in-
dividual cardinal welfare or happiness.This function
could be considered ‘democratic’ in the sense of at-
tributing equal weight to each person. In contrast,
the prices relevant for assessing the value of goods
entering GNP are largely determined by the prefer-
ences of people with high purchasing power.The pre-
ferences of individuals without any income to spend
are disregarded.
These steps towards aggregate happiness as a proxy
measure for social welfare would fulfill an old dream
in economics. It seems that the (so far empirically
empty) social welfare maximum of the quantitative
theory of economic policy has at long last been filled
with life.Based on this – so the idea – a welfare max-
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imizing macro policy or optimal taxation policy (for
a discussion see Weisbach 2008) and such like can be
pursued.
However, we nevertheless argue in the following sec-
tions that,for a number of reasons,the presumed “so-
cially optimal” values for the various determinants of
happiness should not – and will not – be used as poli-
cy goals to be pursued by democratic governments.In
order to avoid any misunderstandings,we certainly do
not argue that GNP should be maximized instead of
happiness. Rather, we favor a different approach in
order to use the valuable insights gained from happi-
ness research.
Objections from political economics to the 
maximization of aggregate happiness
The social welfare maximization approach disre-
gards, and tries to substitute for, existing political in-
stitutions and processes.This is the “benevolent dic-
tator” view castigated in constitutional political eco-
nomy.It applies to all kinds of efforts to derive a “so-
cially optimal” policy from the above, i.e., by maxi-
mizing an aggregate goal function. In a democracy,
there are constitutionally designed rules and institu-
tions allowing citizens to reveal their preferences
and to provide politicians (the government) with an
incentive to actualize them. As such, the maximiza-
tion of a social welfare function is an intellectual
exercise. Even if the government were to pay atten-
tion to the results, it has limited incentive to follow
up on them.
Citizens as metric stations
The social welfare maximizing approach, based on
empirically estimated happiness functions, disre-
gards the institutions on which democracy is based.
Citizens are reduced to ‘metric stations’. They are
forced into a state of passivity, which tends to in-
crease their alienation from the state.In this respect,
a happiness maximization approach is inimical to
democracy. It disregards the interaction between cit-
izens and politicians, the special-interest lobbying of
organized groups and the concomitant information
and learning processes.
The latter argument refers to the fundamental direct
interrelation between the approach applied to col-
lective choices in a society and individual well-being.
People have preferences for processes over and above
outcomes. They gain well-being from living and act-
ing under institutionalized processes, as they con-
tribute to a positive sense of self, addressing innate
needs of autonomy,relatedness and competence.We
call this contribution to individual well-being “pro-
cedural utility”. In the economy, individuals have
been shown to enjoy procedural utility in their capa-
cities as consumers or income earners; in the polity
and society, as citizens subjected to different politi-
cal and societal procedures; in organizations, as em-
ployees confronted with different organizational pro-
cedures; and in law, as litigants (for an introductory
survey, see Frey et al. 2004, and for an application 
to democracy, see Frey and Stutzer 2005). If people
are reduced to “metric stations”, they experience 
a significant loss of autonomy, and therefore re-
duced (procedural) well-being, when dealing with
public affairs.
Happiness research also fails to provide a rule about
the scope and limitations of government interven-
tion in the private sphere.Should the government be
allowed to prohibit the consumption of alcohol if
this were to raise the population’s happiness in the
long run, or should this be left to the discretion of
individuals (based on the results of happiness re-
search)? And even more importantly:To what extent
should the government be allowed to change the pref-
erences of its citizens? Many current interventions
might affect people’s well-being in the future due to a
change in preferences. Consider two extreme cases.
Suppose that the government could adopt a policy of
making people humble by reducing their material
aspirations initially so that they are more apprecia-
tive of material benefits afterwards.Or,suppose that
the government could raise a National Happiness In-
dicator by inducing people to take a “happiness pill”.
Should such policies be accepted? This question can-
not be answered within the happiness maximization
calculus,but must be decided at a more fundamental
level.A feasible and theoretically consistent approach
is to resort to the constitutional level, where people
make such fundamental decisions behind the veil of
uncertainty (see the section on a constitutional per-
spective below).
Probably the most fundamental issue is whether
happiness is the ultimate goal to be maximized.
Other valid goals, for instance, may be loyalty, re-
sponsibility, self-esteem, freedom or personal deve-
lopment.Whether happiness is the ultimate goal of
individuals, or whether it is only one of severalgoals, has been a controversial issue in philosophy
for centuries.
Playing the system
So far, we have assumed that the decision to maxi-
mize social welfare in terms of aggregate (measured)
happiness does not have any influence on the mea-
surement of subjective well-being.This assumption is
highly debatable. Indeed, the political use of aggre-
gate happiness would certainly induce strategic in-
teractions between government and individuals.Two
kinds of distortions need to be taken into account.
Once aggregate happiness has become politically
relevant, the government, public bureaucracy and
various interest groups have an incentive to manipu-
late it. This has proved to be true for GNP and for
other economic indicators declared to be goals of
government activity such as the unemployment rate,
budget deficits and public debts.In the rare case that
a government is unable to manipulate a particular
indicator to its benefit, it has an incentive to create
new indicators. This is easily possible in the case of
happiness. A variety of indicators may capture indi-
vidual well-being.Governments and pressure groups
will choose those indicators most beneficial to their
respective interests, or will create new ones better
suited to their purposes.
A second systematic distortion stems from respon-
dents’ incentives to misrepresent their well-being.
When individuals become aware that the happiness
level they report influences the behavior of political
actors, they have an incentive to misrepresent it.
They can “play the system”.
Two limitations that ask for prudence
Consequences of adaptation and aspirations for
public policy?
A central finding in happiness research is that many
effects of life circumstances have only a short-lived ef-
fect on reported subjective well-being. Extreme and
well-known examples are paraplegics who after a time
of hardship in the long run report to be only a little less
happy than before, and lottery winners who after a
short period of elation report to be not much happier
than before. A more recent study based on longitudi-
nal data finds that average life satisfaction drops when
being subjected to a moderate disability but almost
fully recovers to the pre-disability level after two years.
In the case of a severe disability the recovery, howev-
er, is incomplete (Oswald and Powdthavee 2008).
The second, closely related phenomenon is the
change of people’s aspirations due to changes in
their life circumstances. In the context of econom-
ics, an important finding is that people adjust to
increases in their income (e.g. Stutzer 2004).
Hedonic adaptation and the aspiration treadmill are
not problematic as such for the measurement of in-
dividual welfare. However, they have great conse-
quences for social welfare maximization depending
on how they are treated. Let us consider the case
where courts have to decide about compensation
for losses suffered in a car accident. For the same
physical harm, should they award lower damages to
people with a strong capacity to adapt and higher
damages to others? Or in the area of government
taxation,what costs of taxation should be taken into
account? Materialists with high income aspirations
suffer a great deal from personal income taxes.
Should they be exempted from tax and government
services be financed by people who can easily adapt
to whatever material living standard they are con-
fronted with?
What matters in our context is that the means for
dealing with hedonic adaptation and the aspiration
treadmill are not part of the formal happiness maxi-
mization. Instead the means must be sought at a
more fundamental level,i.e.,at a constitutional level.
A social decision making mechanism is required to
indicate how adaptation and aspiration effects have
to be dealt with in public policy.Obviously such deci-
sions have grave consequences for economic policy,
which the social welfare maximization approach can-
not address.
Happiness measures as normative preferences
The various happiness measures capture different as-
pects of individual well-being and thus different con-
cepts of individual welfare.For a measure of reported
subjective well-being to serve as a proxy for individ-
ual welfare, an important assumption is necessary:
The standards underlying people’s judgments are
those the individual would like to pursue in realizing
his or her ideal of the good life. People’s judgments
about their life can then serve as a proxy for their
individual welfare. People are assumed to pursue in-
dividual welfare based on some stable evaluation
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standards. Moreover, the extent to which individual
welfare is identified depends on whether the evalua-
tion metric fits people’s judgments about their life.
The normative basis of this approach thus goes be-
yond assuming the pursuit of happiness and also
involves choosing the concrete evaluation metric to
elicit people’s judgments.
Some people might favour a distant perspective re-
flecting on one’s life ex post facto, while others fa-
vour the reasoned ex ante evaluations as their stan-
dards.Still others might give priority to how they feel
when experiencing life as it occurs. Imagine those
people who see happiness or high standards of indi-
vidual welfare as a cognitive appraisal that the over-
all quality of life is judged in a favourable way. For
them, general evaluations of their satisfaction with
life as a whole might be an appropriate metric to
capture judgments about individual welfare.For those
people who equate individual welfare with moment-
to-moment affect, individual welfare might be best
measured by such approaches as the experience sam-
pling method or the day reconstruction method.
A constitutional perspective on happiness research
Based on the outlined objections and limitations, we
argue that happiness research should not aim at con-
structing a social welfare function at all. Instead the
insights provided by happiness research should be
used in a different way. Our vision rests on the fun-
damental presumption that the quality of the politi-
cal process is a key factor in people’s happiness and
that the legitimacy of political action finally rests on
the voluntary agreement of the citizens involved. In-
dividual sovereignty should not be reduced to self-
reports on well-being. It should include choices on
how to best pursue happiness, both individually and
collectively.The claim is not for ‘naïve’ consumer or
citizen sovereignty,which assumes optimal behavior.
People, with their bounded rationality and bounded
willpower, are sometimes aware of their own limita-
tions (and sometimes aware only of the limitations
of their fellow citizens).
Accordingly, at the collective level, the political pro-
cess should be institutionally structured so that peo-
ple’s common interests become the principal driving
force. Economic policy must help to establish those
fundamental institutions,which make politicians and
public bureaucrats most responsive to people’s com-
mon interests (dominating behind a veil of uncertain-
ty) and which finally lead to the best possible fulfill-
ment of individual preferences.As argued above,hap-
piness is not necessarily people’s ultimate goal. It
may even be that people see some virtue in unhap-
piness if they reckon that discontent is the only way
to overcome social ills.
Happiness research has two different practical uses
for policy: (1) It helps to identify which institutions
enable individuals to best meet their preferences and
which therefore contribute most to their personal
happiness; (2) It provides important informational
inputs for the political process.
(1) Happiness research provides insights on how,
and to what extent, institutions have systematic
effects on indicators of individual well-being.The
emphasis is on institutions rather than specific
policy interventions. To give an example, happi-
ness policy should focus on the relationship be-
tween the fiscal constitution of a jurisdiction and
people’s subjective well-being rather than on the
optimal tax scheme in terms of happiness. The
range of institutions under study includes self-
binding mechanisms, social norms, private and
public law (i.e., the rules of the game), as well as
constitutional conditions on how to choose rules.
The latter, for example, involves the possibility 
of direct democratic decision making (Frey and
Stutzer 2000).
(2) The results gained from happiness research
should be taken as informational inputs into the
political process. These inputs have yet to prove
themselves in political competition, in citizens’
discourse, and also in the discourse between citi-
zens and politicians. Happiness research already
has produced many insights, which can be intro-
duced into the political discussion process. They
include policy issues like, for example, the effect
of mandatory retirement and mandatory school-
ing on happiness (Charles 2004; Oreopoulos
2007); the impact of tobacco taxes on smokers’
well-being (Gruber and Mullainathan 2005); or
the relation between working time regulations
and people’s subjective well-being (Alesina et al.
2005). A competent overview of selected find-
ings,with policy relevance,is provided by Diener
et al. (2010).
The proposed constitutional vision takes into ac-
count that there is a demand for happiness research
in the current politico-economic process. For exam-
ple, parties in competition will want to learn about
voters’ preferences from data on reported subjectivewell-being. This demand for analyses might include
evaluations of specific policy issues as well as grand
policy schemes. Or, the public administration involv-
ed in valuing public goods will use the life satisfac-
tion approach (for a review, see Frey et al. 2010) in
order to get complementary information for cost-be-
nefit analyses.
Concluding remarks
We asked at the outset about the consequences of
happiness research for public policy. Based on a po-
litical-economic analysis,we respond that the appro-
priate approach is not to maximize aggregate hap-
piness directly by seeking to improve outcomes
through direct policy interventions. Rather, we see
the role of happiness research as seeking to improve
the nature of the political processes. Individuals
should have more opportunity of advancing what
constitutes their idea of the good life,both individu-
ally and collectively. They should be made aware
that different issues require different measures and
indicators of well-being. Happiness research should
remain open to constructing a number of different
indicators, reflecting well-being according to differ-
ent aspects of life. Plurality is a necessary conse-
quence of the procedural view outlined. This is in
stark contrast to the maximization approach requir-
ing one single objective. From a constitutional
standpoint, we conclude that people are best served
with comparative institutional analyses on subjec-
tive well-being.
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